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Abstract
The article aims to describe the historical sequence, interrelatedness, and development of dominant and emerging
research areas within the concentrated ownership literature. Moreover, it aims to determine the most inﬂuential articles,
authors, journals, and countries in the ﬁeld by applying a bibliometric analysis. The latter reveals that the future research
concerning concentrated ownership should be more country-based and use consistent and more extended data sets. It
should also apply different theoretical frameworks, profound institutional analysis, and look for cross-fertilization of
ideas, which could be spread worldwide.
Keywords: Ownership structure, Concentrated ownership, Blockholders, Large owners, Controlling owners, Bibliometric
analysis
JEL classiﬁcation: G30, G32, G34

Introduction

T

he issue of how concentrated ownership in the
hands of a speciﬁc owner or a group of owners
could affect the ﬁrm's performance has been the
subject of the debate among researchers for a long
time. Three signiﬁcant problems have been dominating economic research on concentrated ownership, so far. First, as advocated by proponents of the
leading agency, the theoretical explanation of
corporate governance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen,
1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is a principal-agent
problem, claiming that each small shareholder lacks
the incentives or contractual mechanisms to align
the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Consequently, managers may exert substantial discretion over ﬁrm decisions and divert
corporate resources for private gain (Berle & Means,
1932; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). At the other extreme, in cases of large owners
who either directly manage the ﬁrm or internalize

the beneﬁts from monitoring managers, managerial
interests are aligned with those of the large shareholder (the active monitoring or the alignment hypothesis). Large shareholders can exert governance
through direct intervention in a ﬁrm's operations,
otherwise known as a “voice” (Friend & Lang, 1988;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) or can govern through an
alternative mechanism known as “exit” e selling
their shares if the manager underperforms
(Edmans, 2014; Edmans & Holderness, 2017).
Second, large shareholders can create a different
agency problem, the so-called principal-principal
problem, referring to the counterbalancing forces
between the monitoring and expropriation effect of
the ownership concentration on performance (e.g.
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Stulz, 1988; Burkart et al.,
1997, 1998). The theoretical debate over the effect of
ownership concentration on ﬁrm performance has
led to conﬂicting results, where the alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between
ownership concentration and ﬁrm performance and
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the exploitation hypothesis a negative one. These
conﬂicting theoretical predictions are accompanied
by diverse empirical evidence. Several studies support the alignment monitoring hypothesis in
shaping principal-principal conﬂicts and the role of
ownership concentration in the alignment of interests of owners (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990;
Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Gorton & Schmid, 2000;
Konijn et al., 2011). Other studies reinforced the
expropriation hypothesis (Laeven & Levine, 2008;
Leech & Leahy, 1991; Lehman & Weigand, 2000;
Mudambi & Nicosia, 2002). Moreover, some claim
that the relation between the ownership concentration and performance is non-linear; either it takes a
quadratic form (De Miguel et al., 2004; Busta et al.,
2014) or it is U-shaped (Russino et al., 2019).
Third, complementary to the one owner vs.
dispersed ownership controversy, a parallel discussion tackles multiple owners (blockholders) and
their inﬂuence on the ﬁrm's performance. Based on
the assertion that blockholders can start interacting
with one another, several theoretical models got
built to show the effects of multiple owners on a
ﬁrm's performance. Blockholders can merge into
coalitions. Coalitions may either be established due
to cooperation or are based on the non-cooperative
game (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch &
Hege, 2003; Gomes & Novaes, 2006; Pagano & Roell,
1998; Zwiebel, 1995). Blocholders on one side ﬁght to
form a ruling coalition to extract private beneﬁts
(Laeven & Levine, 2008). On the other hand, they
may establish risk-sharing instruments (Bloch &
Hege, 2003) and reduce the initiative of the largest
blockholders to overmonitor or undermonitor the
management of the ﬁrm (Gomes & Novaes, 2006;
Pagano & Roell, 1998). In that way, multiple controls
may increase the ﬁrm's information capital, efﬁciency, and consequently its performance. Besides,
the empirical literature tries to explain the blockholders controversy. For example, it is quite an
agreement that the second-largest owner's position
is essential when considering the impact of concentration of ownership in the ﬁrm's performance. If
the two biggest owners have a high ownership
concentration and the types of the owners are not
heterogeneous, the concentrated cash-ﬂow rights
discourage expropriation of corporate assets (La
Porta et al., 2002; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Russino et al., 2019). On the other hand, the literature is
of different opinions on family-owned ﬁrms, presenting a bulk of closely held ﬁrms with overall
blockholding structure. Family ownership might
exert either a negative impact on a ﬁrm's performance due to the nepotism or succession problem
(Morck et al., 2005; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006) or it can
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impose a positive impact because family-owners
can make contributions that non-family managers
cannot provide (Bennedsen et al., 2015; Laeven &
Levine, 2008). When banks are the main blockholders or build up coalitions with other banks,
banks might negatively inﬂuence a ﬁrm's performance because of short-termism (Martínez & Tribo,
2004). Moreover, institutional environment (La Porta
et al., 2008) and path dependency (Aguilera et al.,
2008, 2015; Hall & Soskice, 2001) can play an
essential role in corporate governance mechanisms.
The literature on blockholding relations is, thus,
diverse either, opening the door to more profound
country studies and different institutional
arrangements.
This paper aims to verify the dominant and
emerging research areas within the concentrated
ownership literature using bibliometric methods.
We set three main hypotheses. First, the bibliometric analysis will indicate the presented discussion on concentrated ownership and its breaking
points. Second, due to the diversity and unresolved
questions, each part of the debate (principal-agent,
principal-principal, and multiple owners' relations)
will face an equal treatment in the existing literature
essentially. Third, a discussion on blockholders’
position (homogeneity/heterogeneity and their coalitions) is getting based on studies made for a
particular country(ies) as the increasing globalization has shown that complex ownership (a term
invented by Lauven and Levine, 2008) is becoming a
new reality.
The rest of the article is organized as follows.
Section 1 introduces the data and methods we used
to analyze the literature of concentrated ownership.
Section 2 shows the development of studies on
concentrated ownership, and the bibliometric analysis results by periods. Section 3 focuses on the
bibliometric analysis results by journals, countries
of publication, and leading authors. Section 4 concludes the article.

1 Data and methodology
To collect relevant information about the articles
and cited references, we used the Scopus database
of articles that we accessed in January 2020. The
Scopus started operating in 2004 and is owned by
Elsevier. The database contains a broader coverage
than the Social Science Citation Index, accessible
online through Thomson Reuters Web of Science. It
is especially recommended to use while mapping

smaller research areas (Zupic & Cater,
2015).
Since the research topic on concentrated ownership is rather broad, the Scopus allowed us to easier
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identify the research fronts. Therefore, to limit the
scope and retrieve articles that focus speciﬁcally on
ownership concentration, we included in our
searches the following keywords combined with the
Boolean operator OR: “ownership concentration”,
“concentrated ownership”, “blockholder*", “block
owner*", “block shareholder*", “large owner*",
“large shareholder*", “controlling owner*" and
“controlling shareholder*". Since not all journals
publish article keywords, our search also included
their titles and abstracts. Our inquiry into identiﬁed
concepts yielded 3797 articles. We further limited
our search to articles published in the business and
economics research area and articles written in the
English language. This step reduced our database to
3108 articles published between 1969 and 2019. We
excluded the so-called 95 unwanted articles that
were not in any sense discussing the concentrated
ownership, and could, consequently, reduce the
validity of the results. Therefore, our ﬁnal database
contains 3013 published between 1969 and 2019.
To deﬁne the dominant and emerging areas of
research within the concentrated ownership literature as objectively as possible, we performed three
different bibliometric methods. First, we applied a
citation analysis to reveal the 20 most cited articles
and looked for the ten authors, journals, and countries, which published the highest number of articles in concentrated ownership literature. Since
researchers cite earlier articles that they consider
essential to support their notion, citations can be
seen as a measure of inﬂuence. If an article is
heavily cited, it is considered essential for a particular scientiﬁc ﬁeld.
However, by collecting the bibliographic data
from the Scopus database, we could not systematically check on whether all the essential articles are
gathered in our analysis. In order to avoid this
limitation, we performed the second bibliographic
method, which is the co-citation analysis. The latter
connects publications based on joint appearances in
the reference list. A fundamental idea behind the
co-citation analysis is that the more often speciﬁc
articles are cited together, the higher the chance
their content is related. Therefore, the co-citation
analysis reveals the articles that are potentially not
included in the database. Yet, they are highly cited
in the literature's observed ﬁeld and thus crucial for
its development. Since the publishing process is
time-consuming and citations need time to accumulate, the co-citation analysis shows the research
ﬁeld's state some time before the observation (Zupic

& Cater,
2015). The co-citation analysis enabled us
to distinguish essential, highly cited articles in

concentrated ownership literature, which were not
included in our database.
However, since citation analysis can be biased
towards the older article, and since it cannot identify
interconnection among articles, we also applied the
third bibliographic method e bibliographic
coupling. Bibliographic coupling is a clustering
technique that uses the number of references shared
by two documents as a measure of similarity between them, meaning that the more two articles
overlap, the stronger their connection (Zupic &

Cater,
2015). Moreover, although the bibliographic
coupling is not as widely used as co-citation analysis, it addresses many of its limitations. Namely, it
does not require citations to accumulate, since it
directly maps recent publications based on how
they cite rather than earlier published articles that
were cited the most (Zhao & Strotmann, 2008).
Therefore, the bibliographic coupling is recommended to use for clustering emerging and smaller
subﬁelds. Concentrated ownership satisﬁes both
criteria.

2 Literature on concentrated ownership by its
origins and in different studied periods
Fig. 1 shows that the literature on concentrated
ownership has been experiencing an exponential
increase from 1994 onwards. The growth was even
more rapid after the year 2001. In the last decade,
from 2010 to 2019, the number of articles grew from
161 in 2010 to 297 in 2019, an 84.5% increase. The
number of citations in the same period grew at an
even faster rate and increased from 10,544 citations
in 2007 to 29,956 in 2019, a 184% increase. To attain a
better overlook over the research ﬁeld of concentrated ownership, we divide this section into two
parts. In the ﬁrst part, we explain the development
of the ﬁeld of concentrated ownership and its main
phases (periods) up to now, while in the second, we
provide a systematic overview of the discussion by
periods.
2.1 The development of research on concentrated
ownership and its main periods
To attain a better understanding of the progress
and evolution of the research areas in the literature
of concentrated ownership, we divided our dataset
into different periods. We constructed a one 25-year
interval spanning from 1969 to 1994. The literature
on concentrated ownership started accumulating
more rapidly from 1994; thus, a more thorough
analysis needed to be performed for years after.
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Fig. 1. The number of articles (left axis) and the number of citations per year (right axis) of the literature on concentrated ownership. Source: Scopus
database (2020) and own work.

Therefore, we constructed one ten-year interval
spanning 1995e2004 and another one spanning
2005e2014. The reason for such division lies in the
fact that discussions written in the articles published
in the ﬁrst interval were relatively modest. This
period the best reveals the intentions of the socalled Great Moderation, describing the period of
decreased macroeconomic volatility experienced in
the United States (Bernanke, 2004), followed by a
substantial ﬁnancial cycle in the whole world (Great
Recession). The second interval contains the eruption of articles on concentrated ownership, published during the ﬁnancial cycle. Last but not least,
we constructed a ﬁve-year interval 2015e2019,
capturing the articles written in the years after the
economic recovery.
A short comparison of the studied periods is
provided in Table 1. It reveals that the period with
the most published articles is the last period going
from 2005 to 2014. However, the most cited articles
and the articles with the highest average citations
per article were written between 1995 and 2004. The
reason why the number of citations is not the largest
in the period with the highest number of published
articles or perhaps in the last studied period can be
partly attributed to the fact that citations need time
to accumulate. Furthermore, the period with the
highest h-index is the period between 2005 and

2014. The h-index is a metric measuring productivity, as well as the impact of each period. More
speciﬁcally, the h-index is based on the highest
number of papers included that have had at least
the same number of citations.
One of the main concerns is whether we included
all relevant publications discussing concentrated
ownership in our database. There exists the possibility that essential articles were published in books
or journals not yet indexed at the time. Also, there
may exist articles that are not directly discussing or
mentioning concentrated ownership, yet they
played an essential role in the emergence of the ﬁeld
in the past. To mitigate this concern, we performed
a document co-citation analysis and made a qualitative review of the results.
The co-citation analysis revealed that only a few
articles and books, all published before 1990, are not
part of our database due to the mentioned obstacles,
yet, they need special attention. The origins of the
ownership structure literature can be traced back to
Berle and Means' (1932) “The Modern Corporation
and Private Property”, known for describing the
separation of ownership and control in America's
largest companies. They claim that the owners lose
control over their resources due to ownership being
so widely dispersed across many of them. The
owner holding such a small share of the ﬁrm cannot

Table 1. The number of articles, average number of articles per year, sum of citations, average number of citations per article, and h-index for the
studied periods.
Period

1969e1994

Articles
39
Articles/year
1.6
Sum of citations
6920
Average citations
177.4
h-index
24
Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.

1995e2004

2005e2014

2015e2019

Total

304
30.4
54,290
178.6
98

1511
151.1
46,327
30.7
103

1159
231.8
5096
4.4
27

3013
60.3
112,633
37.4
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exercise efﬁcient monitoring over modern corporations' managerial performance. In such cases,
management exercises more freedom in using a
ﬁrm's resources than would exist if its owners
managed the ﬁrm or if the ﬁrm's ownership structure was concentrated. Therefore, Berle and Means
formed the modern corporation concept as one run
by managers uncountable to owners. However, their
interests were not necessarily in line with owners'
interests. Thus, the separation of ownership and
control became the essence for the emergence of the
principal-agent conﬂict theory, which refers to the
difﬁculties owners face to assure the return on their
investment.
Their image stimulated the formation of another
widely cited work created by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). In their study, they show, in light of the
principal-agent conﬂict, how owners' and managers'
interests become increasingly aligned as the managers' percentage of the ﬁrm's ownership increases.
By owning a larger ownership share, managers bear
higher direct wealth consequences from their
decisions.
Fama and Jensen (1983) challenged this view and
warned about offsetting costs of signiﬁcant management ownership. They suggested that market
discipline may still force manager towards value
maximization when he or she owns a small ownership share. However, if a manager held a larger
ownership share, he would ensure himself a more
considerable voting power to, for instance, guarantee his employment, pay himself a large salary, or
withdraw corporate funds. Stulz (1988) in his study
also supports their thesis by building a model
showing that the ﬁrm's value is higher when management is owning a smaller share of ownership
and is lower when management is controlling a
higher ownership share. Similarly, Morck, Shliefer
and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Serves (1990)
observe that managers' and shareholders' interests
become more closely aligned as managerial
ownership increases, resulting in improved ﬁrm
performance. However, they proved that, as managers' ownership share continues to increase, their
interests start to deviate from owners heading,
which results in more signiﬁcant principal-agent
conﬂict and weakens ﬁrm performance. Also, they
proposed that the identity of large shareholders
might potentially be relevant.
The ﬁrst generation of literature that presented
the basis for the evolution of concentrated ownership literature, therefore, dealt with the principalagent conﬂict in the typical Berle and Means corporation, which is widely held by numerous small
owners but controlled by managers. The researchers

have widespread negative associations towards
large owners. However, Berle and Mean's image
began to show its weaknesses when the literature
started proving that widely held ﬁrms are a rare
phenomenon since concentrated ownership was
detected even among the most powerful American
corporations (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Shleifer
& Vishny, 1986). Moreover, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) neglect the proposition that large owners'
primary reason is to expropriate or withdraw
corporate funds. They claimed that ﬁrms owned by
large owners do survive in high numbers.
2.2 A more detailed overview of the literature, by
periods
After 1994, the number of published articles
studying concentrated ownership started expanding, and accelerated following 2001. To look for the
essential articles, authors, journals, and countries in
concentrated ownership literature, we performed a
citation analysis. The results of the 20 most cited
articles are presented in Table 2. However, to better
understand how the literature on concentrated
ownership developed and which areas of research
were the most dominant or emerging, we conducted
a bibliographic coupling analysis. The latter enabled
us to obtain clusters of articles based on the reference they share. We performed analysis for three
different periods. In the ﬁrst period, we included all
the articles written between 1995 and 2004. In the
second period, we included those written between
2005 and 2014, and in the last period, we considered
articles written between 2015 and 2019. For the ﬁrst
two periods, we took into consideration articles cited
at least ten times. For the last period, since citations
can be delayed due to the slow process of publication, we considered the articles that were cited at
least ﬁve times.
2.2.1 Clusters of articles published between 1995 and
2004
Fig. 2 shows that we can distinguish between
three large clusters of articles written between 1995
and 2004. The green cluster mainly represents the
articles that continuously focus on principal-agent
conﬂict (Agrawal & Knoebler, 1996; Burkart et al.,
1997; Denis et al., 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and
the interrelationship between concentrated ownership and ﬁrms' board structure (Cyert et al., 2002;
Denis et al., 1997a; Denis & Sarin, 1999; Mak & Li,
2001). The cluster also contains two articles listed
among 20 most cited articles in the literature of
concentrated ownership. Agrawal and Knoebler's
study (1996), which ranks as the eighth-most cited
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Table 2. The 20 most cited articles in the literature of concentrated ownership.
Authors

Article

Journal

Year

Citations

R

Cit./year

R

Shleifer, A. &
Vishny, R.W.
La Porta, R.; Lopezde- Silanes, F. &
Shleifer, A.
La Porta, R., LopezDe- Silanes, F.,
Shleifer, A. &
Vishny, R.
Claessens, S.,
Djankov, S. &
Lang L.H.P.

A survey of corporate governance
Corporate ownership around the
world
Investor protection
and
corporate
governance

Journal of Finance

1997

5668

1

257.6

1

Journal of Finance

1999

4578

2

228.9

2

Journal of Financial
Economics

2000

2402

3

126.4

3

The separation of
ownership
and
control
in
East
Asian Corporations
Investor protection
and
corporate
valuation

Journal of Financial
Economics

2000

2366

4

124.5

4

Journal of Finance

2002

1643

5

96.6

5

Disentangling the
incentive
and
entrenchment effects
of
large
shareholdings
The
ultimate
ownership
of
Western European
corporations
Firm performance
and mechanism to
control
agency
problems between
managers
and
shareholders
Managerial control
of voting rights.
Financing policies
and the market for
corporate control
Private Beneﬁts of
Control: An International
Comparison
Bank governance,
regulation and risk
taking
Corporate ownership structure and
the informativeness
of accounting earnings in East Asia
Executive compensation
structure,
ownership,
and
ﬁrm performance
Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure

Journal of Finance

2002

1593

6

93.7

6

Contemporary Accounting Research

2002

1534

7

90.2

8

Journal of Financial
Economics

1996

1173

8

51.0

11

Strategic Management Journal

1988

1100

9

35.5

19

Journal of Finance

2004

991

10

66.1

10

Journal of Financial
Economics

2009

922

11

92.2

7

Journal of Financial
Economics

2002

852

12

50.1

13

Quarterly Journal
of Economics

1995

831

13

34.6

20

Journal of Accounting
and
Public
Policy

2003

767

14

47.9

14

La Porta, R., Lopezde- Silanes, F.,
Shleifer, A. &
Vishny, R.
Claessens, S.,
Djankov, S., Fan,
J.P.H. & Lang,
L.H.P.
Faccio, M. & Lang,
L.H.P.

Agrawal, A. &
Knoeber, C.R.

Stulz, M.

Dyck, A. & Zingales, L.

Laeven, L. & Levine, R.
Fan, J.P.H. & Wong,
T.J.

Mehran, H.

Eng, L.L. & Mak,
Y.T.

(continued on next page)
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Table 2. (continued )
Authors

Article

Journal

Year

Citations

R

Cit./year

R

Young, M.N., Peng,
M.W., Ahlstrom,
D., Bruton, G.D.
& Jiang, Y.

Corporate governance in emerging
economies: A review of the principalprincipal
perspective: Review
paper
Dividends
and
expropriation

Journal of Financial
and
Quantitative
Analysis

2008

744

15

67.6

9

Journal of Financial
Economics

2001

731

16

40.6

17

Journal of Finance

2003

706

17

44.1

15

Journal of Accounting and Economics

2005

704

18

50.3

12

Journal of Financial
Economics

2004

688

19

45.9

15

Journal of Financial
Economics

2003

652

20

40.8

16

Faccio, M., Lang,
L.H.P.
& Young, L.
Hartzell, J.C.
& Starks, L.T.

Institutional
Investors and Executive Compensation
Morck, R., WolfCorporate goverenzon, D. &
nance,
economic
Yeung, B.
entrenchment, and
growth
Why are foreign
Doidge, C., Karolyi,
G.A. & Stulz,
ﬁrms listed in the
U.S. worth more?
R.M.
Founding
family
Anderson, R.C.,
Mansi, S.A. &
ownership and the
agency cost of debt
Reeb, D.M.
Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.

paper, discuses several mechanisms which can
diminish principal-agent conﬂict, among which,
they state, is also concentrated ownership. Namely,
concentrated ownership in a large owner's hands

can increase managerial monitoring, which potentially improves ﬁrm performance.
However, the most cited article in the green
cluster and the most cited article in concentrated

Fig. 2. Cluster of articles in the literature of concentrated ownership in the period between 1995 and 2004. Source: Scopus database (2020) and own
work.

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2021;23:152e169

ownership literature is an article titled “A Survey of
Corporate Governance”, written by Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997. The article pays particular attention to
studying the importance of ownership concentration in corporate governance around the world. The
authors once again expose the seriousness of principal-agent conﬂict and suggest that large owners
can be very useful in solving it since they enjoy
higher control over the ﬁrm. Nevertheless, they may
also worsen it by ineffectively redistributing wealth
from other shareholders to themselves. They propose that large owners may follow their interests,
which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of employees, managers, and other investors.
Therefore, they suggest that the legal protection of
owners’ rights is an essential element of the effective corporate governance system. This article sets
the root for the emergence of other articles that
study ownership concentration worldwide, gathered
in the red cluster of Fig. 2.
In the beginning, most of the studies examining
the relationship between ownership structure and
ﬁrm performance were performed using a sample of
the United States ﬁrms, and not much was known
about the ownership structures elsewhere. The vast
majority of concentrated ownership literature,
therefore, focused its attention on studying two
extreme ownership structures: whether the ﬁrm's
ownership was completely dispersed among
numerous owners (Berle & Means, 1932) or whether
it is in the hands of one large owner (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However,
from the 90s onwards, researchers started to study
also the ownership structure worldwide. Their
studies show that ownership structures are indeed
much more complex than it was predicted at ﬁrst.
The articles conﬁrmed that relatively few ﬁrms are
widely held and that concentrated ownership is
highly present in developed and developing countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Dyck & Zingales, 2004;
Faccio & Lang, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2002; La Porta
et al., 1999). Besides the largest controlling owner,
other large owners, combined with smaller owners,
are present in the ﬁrm's ownership structure (Faccio
& Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). La Porta et al.
(1999) revealed that multiple large shareholders are
present in 25% of the ﬁrm's ownership structure in
their multi-country sample, while 32.2% of Asian
ﬁrms (Claessens et al., 2000) and 39% of European
ﬁrms are owned by at least two large owners (Faccio
& Lang, 2002). Moreover, these ﬁrms are typically
controlled by families (Claessens et al., 2000; Dyck &
Zingales, 2004; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Fan & Wong,
2002; La Porta et al., 1999).
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The red cluster is of particular importance since
it contains nine articles ranked among the 20 most
cited articles in concentrated ownership literature.
Therefore, based on the number of citations, this
cluster unites articles that became a dominant
theoretical reference in concentrated ownership
research. Firstly, the articles emphasize that
concentrated ownership is a much broader phenomenon than it was ﬁrst thought. Secondly, they
ﬁnd that concentrated ownership is often, especially in developing countries, accompanied by the
absence of sound corporate governance systems
and low legal protection of minority shareholders.
These studies made a critical shift and started
studying the conﬂicts between different sets of
principals present instead of focusing on the principal-agent conﬂict. The theory became known as
the principal-principal conﬂict, which mainly focuses on a conﬂict between large and minority
owners in a ﬁrm (Claessens et al., 2002; Dyck &
Zingales, 2004; Joh, 2003; La Porta et al., 2000, 2002;
Lemmon & Lins, 2003). Principal-principal conﬂicts
became deﬁned by concentrated ownership, inadequate legal protection of minority shareholders,
and weak corporate governance systems (La Porta
et al., 1999), such as lower ﬁrm performance
(Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Lins,
2003), lower levels of dividends payout (La Porta
et al., 2000), and, in various circumstances, expropriation of minority owners (Claessens et al., 2000;
Faccio et al., 2001; Mitton, 2002).
The blue cluster in Fig. 2 mainly contains the
articles studying the effect concentrated ownership
has on ﬁrm performance (Dalton et al., 2003). Some
articles ﬁnd a positive correlation between
concentrated ownership and ﬁrm value (Gedajlovic
& Shapiro, 1998; Pedersen & Thomasen, 2003;
Thomasen & Pedersen, 2000). Others report on
ﬁnding a negative one (De Miguel et al., 2004).
Besides, we can also spot articles claiming
concentrated ownership does not affect ﬁrm value
(Chang, 2003; Wright et al., 1996). The articles
joined in the blue cluster also support the hypothesis that large owners’ identity matters in
terms that different institutional owners follow
various corporate strategies, leading the ﬁrm to
attain different levels of performance (Thomasen &
Pedersen, 2000; Thomasen & Rose, 2004). Anderson
et al. (2003), whose article completes the list of 20
most cited articles in the ﬁeld of concentrate
ownership, for instance, ﬁnd a piece of evidence
suggesting that family ownership is associated with
better ﬁrm performance in comparison to the performance of widely held ﬁrms.
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2.2.2 Clusters of articles published between 2005 and
2014
Discovering the principal-principal conﬂict and
the question of the effect that concentrated ownership has on ﬁrm performance take the leading role
among the dominant research areas concerning the
literature of concentrated ownership during the
period 2005 and 2014, while the discussion on
principal-agent conﬂict is pushed into the background. Instead, two new research areas receive
more attention: family ownership and the relationship between multiple large owners.
The green cluster contains articles that continuously focus on studying the effects that concentrated
ownership has on ﬁrm performance. Studies once
again introduce conﬂicting results (Delegado-Garcia
et al., 2010; Perrini et al., 2008; Reddy et al., 2008;
Shan & Mciver, 2011; Thomasen, 2005; Thomasen
et al., 2006). Moreover, they show that the relationship between concentrated ownership and ﬁrm
performance is often conditioned with the largest
owner's identity (Boone et al., 2011; Heugens et al.,
2009; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005).
However, it seems that family ownership, out of
all ownership types, received the most tremendous
attention. Studies performed in the previous

observed period already established the notion that
family-control is by far the most common ownership structure worldwide (Claessens et al., 2000;
Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). The articles joined in the blue cluster of Fig. 3, therefore,
focus speciﬁcally on studying family ownership and
its connection to ﬁrm performance (Jagi et al., 2009;
Liu et al., 2012; Principe et al., 2011; San Martin-Reya
& Duran-Encalada, 2012). Some studies show that
family ﬁrms are more proﬁtable than widely-held
ﬁrms, and they also outperform ﬁrms with other
institutional types of large owners (Andres, 2008).
Other studies suggest that family ﬁrms are less
transparent and exhibit a negative relation to ﬁrm
performance compared to widely held ﬁrms
(Anderson et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we can also
notice studies that could not ﬁnd any inﬂuence that
family ownership would have on ﬁrm performance
(Sacrist
an-Navarro et al., 2011).
A closer look at the small yellow cluster of Fig. 3
reveals the emergence of a new research area in the
literature of concentrated ownership, which is a socalled complex ownership structure area. Plenty of
articles were up until this time written on observing
complex ownership structures, in which researchers
mostly focused on studying the relationship

Fig. 3. Cluster of articles in the literature of concentrated ownership in the period between 2005 and 2014. Source: Scopus database (2020) and own
work.
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between large and small owners. The yellow cluster
presents a shift in this focus since it combines articles that mainly study the relationship between
multiple large owners (Attig et al., 2013; Boubaker &
Sami, 2011; Gianfrate, 2007; Laeven & Levine, 2008;
Mishra, 2011; Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín,
2009).
However, it needs to be pointed out that this idea
is not entirely new. As shown in Fig. 2, this topic was
already analyzed in three articles published between 1995 and 2004. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon
(2000) claimed that large owners compete to create
controlling coalitions since forming a coalition could
enable them private beneﬁts from control. By
grouping their cash ﬂows, they attain higher power
to take more efﬁcient actions then would any of its
owners, and their interests would be better aligned
with the interests of minority owners. Pagano and
Roell (1998) specify the conditions under which
multiple large owners cross-monitor each other.
This mechanism could help to reduce expropriation
and increase the ﬁrm's valuation. Yet, there is also a
negative side to the large owners' presence, since
they may cooperate in pursuing a greater expropriation of minority owners (Zwiebel, 1995).
From 2005 to 2014, the number of published articles discussing this topic grew, and the results of
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studies show that the value of ﬁrms owned by
multiple large owners might be higher as it was
initially thought. The higher ﬁrms’ value was
attached to the fact that multiple large owners take
on an important monitoring role over the controlling owner (Attig et al., 2013; Laeven & Levine, 2008;
Mishra, 2011). Since the values differ, researchers
started advertising to devote more attention to
examine this question.
2.2.3 Clusters of articles published between 2015 and
2019
The studies that analyze the effect of multiple
large owners on ﬁrm performance grow substantially from 2015 to 2019. The growth was so signiﬁcant that this topic became one of the three
dominant research areas of concentrated ownership
literature. Articles on the role of multiple large
shareholders are combined in the red cluster of
Fig. 4. They share a similar message, stating that the
presence of multiple large owners imposes positive
impacts on ﬁrms' corporate governance mechanisms in a way that they limit the ability of controlling owner to extract private beneﬁts and
consequently increases ﬁrms’ value (Ben-Nasr,
Boubaker, & Rouatbi, 2015; Boateng & Huang, 2017;

Fig. 4. Cluster of articles in the literature of concentrated ownership in the period between 2015 and 2019. Source: Scopus database (2020) and own
work.
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Boubaker, Nguyen & Rouatbi, 2016; Boubaker et al.,
2017; Liu et al., 2015).
Furthermore, all articles combined in the blue
cluster of Fig. 4 are once again dealing with familycontrolled ﬁrms. Until now, it already got widely
accepted that family-controlled ﬁrms represent the
prevailing global economic and social force. Their
high involvement in ownership structures worldwide explains the considerable attention researchers
dedicated to understanding the implications families have on ﬁrm performance. However, despite
many articles dealing with the question, and despite
great empirical efforts, researchers still did not come
to the conclusive ﬁndings on the relationship of
family ownership to ﬁrm performance (Minichilli,
Brogi, & Calabro, 2016).
The same goes for the articles joined in the green
cluster. Their attention is continuously directed to
studying the effect that concentrated ownership has
on ﬁrm performance, and studies once again introduce opposing theoretical predictions and inconclusive empirical results within and between
countries (Abdallah & Ismail, 2017; Aguilera &
Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Aguilera et al., 2015; Aluncha
& Kaminski, 2017; Lepore et al., 2017; Nguyen et al.,
2015; Wang & Shailer, 2015).
2.2.4 A comparison of the three observed periods by
the bibliometric analysis results
A comparison of the three periods unveils the
following. Our bibliometric analysis exposed key
topics in concentrated ownership literature, each
bound to a particular period mentioned in the
introduction. In the ﬁrst period (1995e2004), the
researchers' focused on studying the principal-agent
problem. In particular, they mainly analyzed how to
prevent the misbehavior of managers against the
value formation. In the second period (2005e2014),
the researchers focused on studying a principalprincipal problem. More precisely, they were
analyzing concentrated ownership and speciﬁc
owners' effects on the ﬁrm's performance. In the
third period (2015e2019), researchers switched to
giving more attention to a new topic. They focused
on observing multiple large owners, their interactions, and possible effects on a ﬁrm's value. The
analysis clearly indicated the discussion on
concentrated ownership and presented its breaking
points, and is, therefore, in line with our ﬁrst hypothesis set initially.
However, it would be too early to conclude that
such a mechanistic approach is completely observable in our data. In reality, each period did give
more attention to a speciﬁc key topic, yet it also
covered discussions on several other ones.

Moreover, researchers did not study a particularly
critical issue only in one period, but they looked at it
through more periods. For instance, the research on
the principal-agent problem started even before the
ﬁrst period (1994e2004), achieved the highest intensity during the ﬁrst one (the green cluster in
Fig. 2), and got later pushed into the background.
Research on the principal-principal problem, which
achieved the most apparent peak in the second
period (the red cluster in Fig. 2), appeared already in
the ﬁrst one (the red cluster in Fig. 2). It continued in
the third one (the green cluster in Fig. 4), during
which it was based more on a country-level
approach. Family ownership research became
apparent in the second period (the blue cluster in
Fig. 3) and continuously played an essential role in
the third one (the blue cluster in Fig. 4). Moreover,
researchers
studied
the
internationalization
perspective in the ﬁrst period and observed the
worldwide ownership concentration from a principal-agent standpoint (the green cluster in Fig. 2).
However, they switched their focus to country-speciﬁc studies on the impact of ownership concentration on a ﬁrm's performance (the green cluster in
Fig. 4) in the third period.
Consequently, some important topics, such as
theoretical contributions on multiple ownership and
its effects on a ﬁrm's performance (i.e. Zwiebel, 1995;
Pagano & Roell, 1998; Bennedsen & Wolfenzon,
2000; Bloch & Hege, 2003; Gomes & Novaes, 2006),
studies dealing with the exit mechanism by selling
off shares (Edmans, 2014), and profound country
studies on multiple ownership and its effects on a
ﬁrm's performance, received relatively little attention throughout all three periods. Instead, many
existing studies deal with showing a deviating
behavior of countries from the trend in a particular
period. Following our bibliometric analysis, therefore, we cannot conﬁrm the second hypothesis that
each part of the discussion (principal-agent, principal-principal and multiple owners' relations) is
treated equally. We can also not conﬁrm the third
hypothesis that profound country studies represent
a basis of the current research. Namely, data in most
of the country studies are used to test propositions
of prevailing theoretical concepts of the agency
theory.

3 Journals, countries of publication and
authors
To be more speciﬁc on the above assertion, we
continue by investigating our data set. We ﬁrst
elaborate on a bibliometric analysis of journals that
publish articles on the concentration of ownership
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and its impact on a ﬁrm's performance most
frequently. This is followed by the analysis of
countries where these articles were published, and,
ﬁnally, by the analysis of the main authors publishing the most in the ﬁeld of concentrated
ownership.
3.1 Journals
We constructed a map of all the journals that
published at least ﬁve articles in concentrated
ownership literature and were cited at least 25
times. Fig. 5 shows that we can distinguish between
three clusters of journals. If we look at the clusters
more closely, we see that journals combined in the
red one are mainly concerned with ﬁnance, while
journals combined in the blue cluster are mainly
concerned with the management and in the green
one with an accounting topic. The leading journals
in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance are Corporate Governance: An
International Review, Journal of Corporate Finance, and
Journal of Financial Economics, the leading journals in
the ﬁeld of management are Journal of Management
and Governance, Strategic management Journal and
Asia Paciﬁc Journal of Management, while the leading
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journals in the ﬁeld of accounting are Journal of
Business Ethics, Managerial Finance and Journal of
Applied Business Research.
Table 3 shows the top 10 journals in concentrated
ownership literature based on the number of articles
published in the ﬁeld. Eight are placed in the red
cluster (Fig. 5), and only one in the blue and another
in the green cluster. The journal titled Corporate
Governance: An International Review published 118
articles, followed by the Journal of Corporate Finance
with 106 articles and the Journal of Financial Economics with 74 published articles. However, the one
with the most cited articles is the Journal of Finance.
Articles on concentrated ownership published in
this journal were cited 21,696 times. Based on the
number of citations, the second journal is the Journal
of Financial Economics, of which articles were cited
only a few times less, which is 21,235 times. The
Journal of Corporate Finance is ranked in third place,
with articles being cited 4964 times. These three
journals follow the same ranking also when
comparing them based on the average citation per
article. We also examined the journals based on
their average impact factor achieved over the last
ﬁve years. The impact factor serves as the measure

Fig. 5. Cluster of journals in the literature of concentrated ownership. Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.
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Table 3. Top ten journals with the most published articles in the literature of concentrated ownership.
Journal

Articles

R

Citations

R

Cit./article

R

IF (5 years)

R

Corporate Governance: An International Review
Journal of Corporate
Finance
Journal of Financial Economics
Journal of Banking and Finance
Journal of Management and Governance
Paciﬁc Basin Finance
Journal
Journal of Finance
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Journal of Business Ethics
Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.

118
106

1
2

3921
4964

4
3

33.2
46.8

6
3

4.15
3.18

1
6

74
66
54
50

3
4
5
6

21,235
3014
789
1163

2
5
8
7

287.0
45.7
14.6
23.3

2
4
9
7

7.89
3.53
1.63
1.98

2
5
9
7

43
37
34
33

7
8
9
10

21,696
280
626
1499

1
10
9
6

504.6
7.6
18.4
45.4

1
10
8
5

6.2
0.89
1.97
4.98

3
10
8
4

of the frequency with which an average article was
cited. The Journal of Financial Economics is ranked in
the ﬁrst place with an average impact factor over the
last ﬁve years of 7.89. It is followed by the Journal of
Business Ethics with an average impact factor over
the last ﬁve years of 4.98 and the journal titled
Corporate Governance: An International Review with an
average impact factor over the last ﬁve years of 4.15.
3.2 Countries of publication
The analysis of the results on a country level
which are presented in Table 4 reveals that the
United States is the clear leader in the literature of
concentrated ownership based on the number of
published articles and based on the number of citations. Throughout the whole observed period, 751
articles were published in the United States, followed by 453 articles published in China and 298
articles published in the United Kingdom. The
United States ranked as the ﬁrst country also while
observing the number of citations. The articles
published in the United States reported 52,729 citations. In contrast, Hong Kong, which ranked in the
second place based on the number of citations,
Table 4. Top ten countries with the most published articles in the
literature of concentrated ownership.
Country

Articles

R

Citations

R

United States
751
1
52,729
1
China
453
2
7001
4
United Kingdom 298
3
8602
3
Australia
199
4
2467
9
Spain
167
5
3210
6
Canada
166
6
6020
5
Malaysia
136
7
1213
10
South Korea
131
8
3067
8
Italy
130
9
3135
7
Hong Kong
125
10 14,525
2
Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.

Cit./article

R

70.2
15.5
28.9
12.4
19.2
36.3
8.9
23.4
24.1
116.2

2
8
4
9
7
3
10
6
5
1

reported 14,525 citations and is followed by the
United Kingdom with 8602 reported citations.
However, Hong Kong takes ﬁrst place while ranking
the countries based on the average number of citations per article, with 116.2 average citations per
article. Therefore, it by far overtakes the United
States, which ranked the second place, with 70.2
average citations per article, and the United
Kingdom, which ranked the third place with 36.6
average citations per article.
If we compare the number of published articles of
the ﬁrst three most productive in three different
periods, we can see that the dynamics vary. Fig. 6
shows the United States published 159 articles in the
period from 1995 to 2004, or, on average 15.9 articles
per year, followed by the United Kingdom with 36
articles, or, on average, 3.6 articles per year, while
China published only four articles, or, on average,
0.4 articles per year. In the following period from
2005 to 2014, the United States again holds the
leading role by publishing 393 articles or, on
average, 39.3 articles per year. However, China
takes second place by publishing 60 times more
articles than in the previous period, which is 240
articles or, on average, 24 articles per year and is
followed by the United Kingdom with 146 articles
or, on average, 14.6 articles per year. The last period,

Fig. 6. The number of published articles in the United States, United
Kingdom and China in three different periods. Source: Scopus database
(2020) and own work.
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Table 5. Top ten authors with the most published articles in the literature of concentrated ownership.
Author
Renneboog, L.
Boubaker, S.
Yeh, Y.H.
Guedhami, O.
Kang, J.K.
Ntim, C.G.
Thomsen, S.
Habib, A.
Laeven, L.
Pindado, J.
Source: Scopus

Articles

R

17
1
12
2
12
2
11
4
11
4
11
4
11
4
10
8
10
8
10
8
database (2020)

Citations

R

800
4
185
9
434
6
609
5
1774
1
304
8
894
3
115
10
1578
2
431
7
and own work.

Cit./article

R

47,1
15,4
36,2
55,4
161,3
27,6
81,3
11,5
157,8
43,1

5
9
7
4
1
8
3
10
2
6

which is the period from 2015 to 2019, brings the
switch in the top of the ranking based on the
number of published articles since China now
overtakes the ﬁrst place with 218 published articles,
and is followed by the United Stated with 206 and
the United Kingdom with 121 published articles.
The last period also seems to be the most productive
in terms of the average published articles per year
for all three observed countries. Therefore, China
published, on average, 43.6 articles per year, which
is also twice as much as in the previous period,
while the United States published, on average, 41.6
articles per year, and the United Kingdom published, on average, 24.2 articles per year.
3.3 Main authors
Lastly, we focused on the articles' authors by ﬁrst
studying the most productive authors regarding the
number of articles related to the literature of
concentrated ownership they wrote. Table 5, which
lists the ten authors with the highest number of
published articles in concentrated ownership literature, reveals that the author with the most published articles is Luc Renneboog, with 17 articles. He
is followed by Sabri Boubaker and Yinhua Yeh, both
with 12 articles. In his research, Renneboog mostly
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focused on studying the relation between concentrated ownership and ﬁrms’ mergers and acquisitions. At the same time, Boubaker dedicated his
research to multiple large owners and their impact
on ﬁrm value, with Yeh, in contrast, dedicating it to
the study of the relationship between controlling
owners and board composition and its dynamics.
To check whether there is a difference in authors'
exposure and dominance based on the number of
published papers and based on the number of citations, we prepared a density map of authors in the
literature of concentrated ownership. We limit the
authors to those who published at least ﬁve articles
and were cited at least 50 times. The density map,
presented in Fig. 7, reveals a noticeable difference in
the authors’ exposure if the weight is put on the
number of published articles (left side) or whether it
is put on the number of citations. If it is hard to
differentiate among the authors based on the
number of published articles, it is much easier to
distinguish them based on the number of citations.
Consequently, Table 6 lists the ten authors with
the highest number of citations. The leading author
in terms of the number of citations is Andrei
Shleifer, with 14,244 citations and 2374 average citations per article. Robert W. Vishny follows him
with 9683 citations, and then Rafael La Porta and
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, both being cited 8597
times.
However, all ten of them were already mentioned
in the previous chapter while discussing the most
cited and relevant articles in concentrated ownership literature. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst nine authors, going from Andrei Shleifer to Mara Faccio,
can be found in the red cluster in Fig. 2 and among
the authors of the 20 most cited articles presented in
Table 2. In contrast, David J. Denis is placed in the
green cluster in Fig. 2 and is at the same time not
ranked among the authors of the 20 most cited articles. The authors’ position again proves the
dominance and importance of principal-principal

Fig. 7. Density map of authors in the literature of concentrated ownership with weights put on the number of published articles (left) and the number
of citations (right). Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.
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Table 6. Top ten authors with the most cited articles in the literature of
concentrated ownership.
Author

Citations

R

Articles

Shleifer, A.
14,244
1
6
Vishny, R.W.
9683
2
5
La Porta, R.
8597
3
4
Lopez-de-Silanes, F. 8597
3
4
Lang, L.H.P.
6242
5
6
Claessens, S.
4240
6
6
Djankov, S.
4122
7
3
Fan, J.P.H.
2832
8
5
Faccio, M.
2752
9
7
Denis, D.J.
1804
10 6
Source: Scopus database (2020) and own work.

Cit./article

R

2374.0
1882.7
2149.3
2149.3
1040.3
706.7
1374.0
566.4
393.1
300.7

1
4
2
2
6
7
5
8
11
16

conﬂict theory in the literature of concentrated
ownership, which was, of course, the prevailing
topic of the articles combined in the red cluster in
Fig. 2.
Based on our analysis in the last three subchapters, we can argue that the essential articles in
the ﬁeld of concentrated ownership appeared in the
leading ﬁnancial journals, published mainly in the
USA, China, and the United Kingdom. The USA is
prevailing in all three periods, with China increasingly becoming more critical in the last two
observed periods. Leading authors in terms of citation (which usually determines the research) are the
most exposed authors, known from the theoretical
discussion on principal-agent problems and the
discussion on principal-principal problems. The
above analysis therefore additionally supports the
missing link to our second and third hypotheses, as
already elaborated in the previous chapter. The
focus is still on researching of the ﬁrst two problems, i.e. principal-agent and principal-principal
conﬂicts, set by the leading principal-agent theory,
while the theory of blockholding relations is only
mentioned sporadically (and not elaborated or cited
frequently). This is seen even more in empirical
studies. Country data are in many cases used only to
test propositions of the prevailing theoretical
concepts.

4 Conclusion
It is not a long time ago when the famous quote “it
is now the end of the corporate governance”
(Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) was born. That was
at the time when the Anglo-Saxon shareholder
model became widely spread around the world.
After reaching the Washington Consensus, corporate governance's main focus was to support
dispersed ownership structure in publicly traded
corporations and liquid capital markets. Back then,

researchers and others considered the appearance
of blockholdings as some temporal phenomenon
and/or a substitute for legal protection in a poor
institutional environment. Concentrated ownership
was back then, indeed, viewed as a part of the solution against managers' misbehavior. A few years
later, the term concentrated ownership became a
buzzword in the corporate governance literature,
focusing in the ﬁrst line on dilution of a ﬁrm's value
by self-interested blockholders. However, it seems
that its crucial intentions are driving ﬁrms back
again to reach as dispersed ownership structures as
possible and to reach liquid capital markets. How is
this vicious circle ever going to be resolved?
As shown in our research, the researchers mainly
follow the leading (normative) approaches in the
existing concentrated ownership literature. However, to ﬁnd answers to several critical issues that the
society is dealing with, such as what type of
ownership structure model works and how to
incorporate deeper institutional characteristics into
research, it is of utmost importance to change the
direction and start applying a positive approach.
Moreover, researchers should treat all theoretical
strands more equally. Their focus should not only
be on supporting the mainstream theories, but
should instead investigate which theoretical framework (including building new ones) best ﬁts the data
in a particular environment.
In other words, future research should be more
country-based, using consistent, more extended
data sets, and explaining data by applying different
theoretical frameworks and profound institutional
analysis. In light of heterogeneous corporate structures that characterize the present landscape, the
integrative part of the research would be to look for
cross-fertilization of ideas, which could be spread
worldwide.
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